Gale Barney Judd v. Rowley\u27s Cherry Hill Orchards, Inc. et al : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
Gale Barney Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards,
Inc. et al : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Woodrow D. White; Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant;
Ray H. Ivie; Ivie & Young; Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards, No. 16332 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1642
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GALE BARNEY JUDD , 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ROWLEY'S CHERRY HILL ORCHARDS, 
INC., a Corporation, and 
E. W. ELFAWN WALL, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) __________________________ 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 16332 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge 
RAY H. IVIE 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North University 
P. 0. Box 6 72 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Avenue 
WOODROW D. WHITE 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
F ~LED 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GALE BARNEY JUDD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ROWLEY'S CHERRY HILL ORCHARDS, 
INC., a Corporation, and 
E. W. ELFAWN WALL, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) ------~-------------------) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Case No. 16332 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge 
RAY H. IVIE 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North University Avenue 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84601 
WOODROW D. WHITE 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL . . .. . . . ... .. . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .. . 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
LOSS OF EARNINGS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY 
23 
THE SUBMISSION OF THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY .. .. . . .. . . . . . . .. .. . . . .. . 24 
POINT 2 
THE COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE 
PLAINTIFF IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NOS. 1, 6, 7, AND 9, 
AND IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT 
THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS 
A MATTER OF LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
POINT 3 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION 
NO. 6 TO THE JURY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
POINT 4 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 8, 
AND IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 AS REQUESTED WITH REGARD 
TO DAMAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 
POINT 5 
THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY WERE GROSSLY 
INADEQUATE, AND THE JURY DISREGARDED THE GREAT 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE INSTRUCTIONS 
OF THE COURT IN THE AMOUNT AWARDED FOR DAMAGES 37 
POINT 6 
THE JURY ERRED IN THE AWARDING OF SPECIAL 
DAMAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 
CONCLUSION 43 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd.) 
CASES CITED 
Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P. 2d 826 ..... . 
Bruce v. Madden, 208 Va. 636, 160 S.E. 2d 137 ...... . 
Ferguson v. Jongsma, 10 Utah 2d 179, 350 P. 2d 404 .. 
Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P. 2d 722 ..... . 
King v. Britt, N.C. 148 N.E. 2d 594 (1966) ......... . 
Mullendore v. Gentry, (Mo.) 377 S.W. 2d 494 ........ . 
Paul v. Kirkendall, 261 P. 2d 670 (1953) ........... . 
Pestotnik v. Balliet, (Iowa) 10 N.W. 2d 99 ......... . 
Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P. 2d 176 
Southweld v. DeBoer (Neb.) 80 N.W. 2d 877 
STATUTES 
41 
34 
30 
40 
36 
36 
36 
36 
40 
36 
Section 41-6-54, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 .......... 27 
TEXTS 
22 Am Jur 2d, Section 353 33 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPPillME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
) 
GALE B~lEY JUDD, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
ROlNLEY'S CHEP-RY HILL ORCHARDS, ) 
INC., a Corporation, and ) 
E. W. ELF AWN TrJALL, ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
_________________________ ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case blo. 16332 
STATENENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff-appellant, Gale Barney 
Judd, against the defendants-respondents, Rowley Cherry Hills 
Orchards, Inc., a Corporation, and E. W. Elf~Nn Wall, to recover 
damages for personal injuries she sustained as the result of a 
head-on motor vehicle collision which occurred on July 20, 1977. 
The parties will be referred to herein as they appeared 
in the lower court. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOHER COURT 
The trial of the case was held in the District Court of 
Utah County on the 11th and 12th days of December, 1978, before 
the Honorable J. Robert Bullock and a jury. The case was 
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submitted to the jury on special verdict on December 12, 1973. 
The jury found the defendants 70 percent negligent and the 
plaintiff 30 percent negligent, and awarded special damages in 
the amount of $15,000 and general damages in the amount of 
$10,000, totaling $25,000. The co~rt entered judgment on the 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants 
in the amount of $17,500, the jury a>vard having been reduced 
by 30 percent. The plaintiff made a timely Motion for a New 
Trial on the following grounds: (1) Irregularity in the pro-
ceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of 
the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. (2) Misconduct of the jury. 
(3) Inadequate damages appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or nrejudice. (4) Insufficiency of the 
evidence to justify the verdict, or that it is against la1:v. 
(5) Error in law. The plaintiff also filed a Motion to Amend 
Judgment by increasing the amount of both general and special 
damages in the furtherance of justice. The Hotion for a New 
Trial was accompanied by the Affidavit of Stanford Judd to the 
effect that three members of the jury appeared to be asleep at 
various times during the proceedings. The court entered its 
Order denying plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial on February 6, 
1979. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have the judgment of the lower court 
and the Order denying the Motion for a New Trial reversed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff was born December 31, 195(1 (R. 205), and 
at the time of the collision involved in this lawsuit she had 
57.7 years of reasonable life expectancy. At the time of the 
collision she was a licensed practical nurse employed by the 
Payson Hospital (R. 208-209). She was on her side of the road 
traveling about 40 miles per hour when the defendants' truck 
carne out of a dip into her view on her side of the road. She 
first saw the truck when it was about 300 feet away, immedi-
ately turned right and slammed on her brakes, and skidded into 
the truck (R. 246-247). The investigating officer, Lynn B. 
Richardson, had been an officer of the Utah Highway Patrol for 
ll years, during which time he investigated 60 or 70 accident 
situations a year (R. 248). When he arrived at the scene of the 
accident both vehicles were still in the position they ended up 
in as a result of the impact. There were skidrnarks leading to 
both vehicles (R. 250). He took photographs of the scene of the 
accident represented by Exhibits 3-13, and made a diagram repre-
sented by Exhibit 14 (R. 252). He identified the skidrnarks from 
the point of origin to the wheels of both vehicles (R. 255). 
Defendants' vehicle laid down 67 feet of skidrnarks. The officer 
stated that the defendants' vehicle was completely on the wrong 
side of the road at the point of impact (R. 256-259). The skid-
marks made by plaintiff's vehicle were 79 feet in length to the 
position of the front wheels, and the skidrnark laid down by the 
left side of plaintiff's vehicle was 9 feet ll inches from the 
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East edge of the highway where the skidmark began, and ll feet 
7 inches from the East edge of the high~vay at the point of irr1pac:l 
The roadway at the point of impact was 21 feet wide (R. 258). 
The highway at the point where plaintiff's skidrnarks began was 
18 feet 4 inches wide, and plaintiff was still on her side of 
the road at that point (R. 267). 
The witness Clay Barney testified of a conversation he 
had with defendant Wall at the scene of the accident in which 
the defendant Wall said that he just got confused and Hent the 
wrong way. The witness Barney described both vehicles as 
being on the plaintiff's side of the road. He was there when 
the vehicles were removed away from each other and observed 
the skidrnarks of both vehicles up to the point of impact. The 
skidmarks remained on the highway for a good month afterwards 
(R 331). He took pictures of the skidrnarks about 10 days 
after the accident, which are Exhibits 40-44 inclusive. The 
dark spot across the middle between the skidrnarks shows where 
water escaped from the broken radiators of the cars. The 
skidrnarks shown in Exhibit 40 were completely to the Hest side 
of the highway (R. 333). The defendant's skidmarks veered toward 
the ~vest and were completely on the Hest side of the highway 
at point of impact (R. 334). Exhibit 42 was taken ~vi th the wit· 1 
ness looking South (the direction in which the plaintiff ,.;as 
traveling). This photograph shows the crest of the hill that 
leads into the dip. If you were in the dip you could not be 
seen by a driver approaching from the North (R. 335). Exhibi~-
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shows the angle of the defendant's approach to the point of 
collision, and that the point of impact was on plaintiff's side 
of the road (R. 336). Exhibit 44 shows \-There plaintiff's car 
was thrown by the force of the impact (R. 337). 
The defendant Wall testified that he was driving about 
30 miles an hour, that he first observed plaintiff's car as 
it came on to the top of the hill, that both cars were in the 
middle of the road at that time, that plaintiff's vehicle was 
about 50 feet away when he first saw it, that he locked his 
brakes and the cars collided in the middle of the road (R. 390-
391). He described his procedure prior to impact as follows: 
"Q. And as you were driving along this way, being familiar 
with the area you knew that the approach of vehicles coming 
from the other direction would not be visible to you until 
you got near the crest of the hill, didn't you? 
A. On that, I don't believe you paid that much attention 
to it until that date come up and then you look over it 
since. 
Q. But prior to that time you weren't paying much atten-
tion to that fact prior to that time? 
A. I was just going up the road. 
Q. And even though you were in a dip in the road which 
would prevent you from seeing on-coming traffic, you still 
nroceeded in the middle of the road? 
A. Had to have been the middle of the road, because 
that's ~vhere I come through ..... 
Q. And but you knew that you were in that dip where you 
couldn't be seen by vehicles approaching the crest of 
that hill, didn't you? 
A. I figured you could see a car until that day. 
Q. But you found out since you can't? 
A. Right." (R. 393-394). 
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The defendant r..rall testified that there was no doubt that 
the skidmarks shown on Exhibit 42 were laid down by his vehicle 
(R. 395-396), and that skidmarks shown on Exhibits 40-42 were 
made by the vehicles involved in the collision (R. 399-400). 
He saw the skidmarks after the accident when he rode over the 
road. The defendant Wall testified that he pulled a little to 
the left after he saw plaintiff's car when he applied his brakes 
that he might have pulled a foot to the West, which was also 
shown by the photographs (R. 404-405). 
The witness Everett J. Kester testified that he removed 
the vehicles from the point of impact. He stated that the 
vehicles were in the middle of the road but he did not attempt 
to make any measurement from the skidmarks of either vehicle 
with relationship to the edge of the road. He observed that 
the plaintiff's vehicle was tilted more toward the East (R. 412) 
1 
He said that the skidmarks were in the middle of the road at the 
I 
beginning and angled a small bit off to the West. He just 
generally glanced at the skidmarks left by the plaintiff's car 
(R. 414). 
The witness Carl J. Draper testified that when he arrived 
1 
at the scene of the collision both vehicles were basically in 
the center of the road. On cross examination he said he saw the' 
police officer taking measurements (R. 416). 
Newell Knight, of the Utah State High1vay Patrol, was 
called as an expert witness by the defendants. Counsel for t'le 
defendants asked the witness to assume that the right side of 
defendant Wall's pickup truck was 11 feet 5 inches from the East 
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edge of the surfaced road at the point of impact, and that the 
left side of the plaintiff's automobile was 11 feet 7 inches 
from the East edge of the roadway at that point; that the 
pickup truck left 67 feet of skidmarks prior to impact, and the 
plaintiff's vehicle left 79 feet of skidmarks prior to impact; 
that at the beginning of the 67-foot skidmark the defendant 
Wall's truck was 10 feet 3 inches from the East edge of the 
roadway; that at the beginning of the plaintiff's 79-foot skid-
mark her vehicle was 9 feet 11 inches from the East edge of the 
roadway; that the plaintiff's vehicle was traveling 40 miles 
per hour and the defendant's pickup truck was traveling 30 miles 
per hour (R. 429). The witness charted the skidmarks on Exhibit 65 
and also indicated by a solid line the assumed perception-reaction 
distance. The point of impact is represented on the Exhibit by 
an "X", the beginning of skidmarks of each vehicle are represented 
by a circle with a dot, the skidmarks are represented by a broken 
line, and the perception distance is represented by a straight 
line backward in each case from the commencement of the skidmark. 
He computed the distance plaintiff traveled between perception 
and skidmark at 75 feet, placing her 154 feet from point of 
perception to point of impact, and the defendant's distance 
traveled between perception and skidmark at 57 feet, placing 
him 124 feet from point of perception to point of impact. 
(R. 429-437). 
The expert witness used the angles shown on the colored 
slides (Exhibits 40-44) in charting the skidmarks of both 
Vehicles on Exhibit 65 (R. 446-447). The expert stated that you 
can determine the angle at which a vehicle was traveling prior 
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to the application of the brakes. This means that plaintiff 
was in the process of turning to the right ~hen she applied 
the brakes, because the skidrnark proceeds on a slight angle 
to the right to point of impact. It also indicates that the 
defendant Wall was turning left prior to the application of th,1
1 
brakes, because his skidmark proceeds on an angle to the left 
from application of brakes to point of impact (R. 429-437). 
Discussing Exhibit 43 and the colored slides, the expert witne:l 
said that the skidmarks indicated that the defendant's vehicle 
was moving slightly to the left, and Exhibit 42 indicates that 
the plaintiff's car was moving slightly to the right (R. 446). 
This being true, the defendant only had to veer slightly to be 
completely on the wrong side, and the plaintiff only had to 
move slightly to be completely on her side. The skidmarks of 
both vehicles indicate an angle moving from East to tJest (R. 4)i 
The witness Guy Nelson testified that he arrived at the 
scene shortly after the accident occurred. He indicated on 
Exhibit 63 the position of the car and the truck when he ar-
rived, the truck having been pulled off to the side (R. L21). 
The witness Lloyd L. Nelson arrived at the scene after 
the defendant's truck had been moved and pulled away from point 
of irr,pact, and made marks on Exhibit 63 inclicating the positiov 
of the vehicles involved when he arrivec (R.422). 
The witness Claude Rm·lley indicated on Exhibit 64 the 
position of the vehicles ''her. he arrived at the scene (R. 62?). 
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PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES 
Plaintiff's head struck the windshield, causing a laceration 
above the left brow which required stitches, and which left a scar 
about an inch long. The patella on her left knee was shattered 
open and bleeding; her right ankle was open and bleeding and the . 
bone was sticking out, her foot being turned in a 90 degree angle; 
her right knee was torn and bleeding but not lacerated as severely 
as the left (R. 216). A neck brace was put on her at the scene 
of the accident, and she was removed to the Payson Hospital, where 
they stitched her face and forehead, removed some of the fragments 
from her left kneecap, and wired the two largest ones together 
and stitched them up. They took the fragments out of her right 
knee and wired the two largest pieces together, and manipulated 
her ankle into place (R. 217-218). She was discharged from the 
Payson Hospital August 10, and readmitted for treatment of an 
infection in her left knee (R. 219). 
When asked about the pain she suffered from the time of 
the accident up until the present time, she stated, "Well, it 
was awful because I couldn't do anything; because I wasn't used 
to being waited on." She has required medications for pain con-
tinually. She had a cast on her right leg from the top of her 
thigh to her toes for three weeks. She had a brace on her left 
leg so that they could keep treating her infection (R. 220). 
She returned to work the first time after the accident 
in January 1978, for one or two days a week, and sometimes she 
couldn't do that. She increased her time at work as much as 
she could. It was never possible for her to do her work without 
pain and problems (R. 226). 
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On July 10, 1978, she was admitted to Utah Valley Hospi:l 
for surgery on her left knee by Dr. Chapman (R. 222). The pur. 
pose of the surgery was to remove her patella because it was 
jagged and grinding against her joint, and had caused her much 
suffering and pain and problems. She described the condition 
in her left knee prior to her surgery as follows: 
"Well, just ivhen I'd walk or stay on my feet, the normal 
thing you do. And when I'd even be sitting I couldn't 
sit because -- with my feet bent because it would just, 
it would irritate it constantly, because the way he --
the way the patella was wired together, the two pieces, 
there was a jagged part against my joint, and every 
time my knee would move it would irritate it." 
Prior to the operation on July 10, 1973, she stated thatl 
while working she would have to be careful the way she stepped o: 
her knee would totally give out under her, and her knee wouldgi 
out when she tried to do normal household duties. She had trou:: 
performing her household duties, her knee hurt even while she :i<' 
sitting down, and she would have to move it to different positic 
to prevent spasms from occurring (R. 227-228). 
After the operation of July 10, 1978, she had to wear 
a cast, extending from the middle of her upper leg to just above 
the ankle, for 2-1/2 months (R. 228). She was never released to 
return to v7ork after that operation. \Vhen asked what she could 
do, at the time of the trial, she stated that the performance J 
her household duties caused her discomfort, she couldn't be on 
her feet for a standard length of time, she vras lioi ted in the 
help she could give her husband in his farming activities. 
to the accident she played softball and football. She was on r:' 
girls' basketball team in high school as a regular fonvard, she 
10 
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was on the girls' athletic track team in hgih school, and ran 
the 440 and mile in inter-school competition (R. 229-231). Prior 
to the accident she jogged a mile every night or day (R. 232). 
Prior to the accident she ran a mile in 6.49, but most of the 
time she would do it in 7 minutes. She had engaged in horseback 
activities all her life, riding her registered Appaloosa mare in 
barrel racing and pole bending at various horse shows, riding 
club events, and rodeos (R. 233). Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 is a 
photograph of her participation in a barrel racing event (R. 234). 
She usually rode her horse five times a week -- to head and cut 
cattle on the farm, for riding club practice, and for riding with 
the family up on the mountain for pleasure. Since the accident 
her knees give her trouble when her feet are in the stirrups. She 
has tried to ride her horse about eight times since the accident, 
but it hurts her even with her feet hanging out of the stirrups. 
She can't lope or gallop the horse because it hurts her knees. 
She last rode her horse in October (R. 235). Prior to the 
accident she enjoyed snow skiing, water skiing, and dancing. 
Plaintiff demonstrated to the jury her difficulty in 
sitting down on a chair and getting up from a seated position to 
a standing position. She was required to extend her left leg 
when she went to sit down, and also when she went to stand. She 
can't put any bend in her knee (R. 231). She has some discomfort 
every time she proceeds to a sitting position, or rises from a 
sitting position to a standing position. She was still wearing 
a spiral brace on her left knee (R. 237). She has no kneecap on 
11 
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the left leg, and the scarring extends from the side leg below i 
the knee on an irregular course to the top of the knee. She 
stated that this was open wide when the accident happened. She 
said that these scars on her knees bother her, and she doesn't 
wear short dresses. She exhibited scars on her right knee exte:·. 
ing four or five inches long. There is a permanent scar in her 
right ankle area about the size of a quarter or half dollar whit 
bothers her. The right ankle causes her trouble at the present 
time, which worsens when it is cold. It always has a little sha. 
pain in it if she turns her foot wrong (R. 239). Eversion and 
inversion movements of the right ankle bother her. Walking or 
shopping activity for an extended period of time causes her rig:.·. 
ankle to ache at the present time. Her left knee aches all the 
time, but the right doesn't ache as much (R. 240). 
Plaintiff states that she can't run or do hardly anythin1 
as she would like to do it. She has difficulty climbing stairs. 
She always has to take her left foot forward and keep it s traig1: 
because she feels it will collapse on her if she doesn't. In 
climbing stairs she cannot alternate the right and left foot. 
Going upstairs she has to use her right foot first, and going 
downstairs she has to use her left foot first so that the left 
leg always stays straight (R. 241). On occasions when she gets 
down on the floor to relax or perform work, she has to maneuver 
herself to a couch or chair or cupboard -- something s~e can 
grasp on to -- and bend her right knee and keep her left knee 
straight while getting up (R. 242). 
12 
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When asked if she had a desire to return to her work as 
a licensed practical nurse if she were able to perform that work, 
she answered yes and that she really enjoyed the work. If she 
were able to do so, she would like to pursue her activities as 
an l.p.n. indefinitely, as that is what she went to school for 
(R. 243-244). 
Dr. David Cannon Flinders, a physician with specialized 
training in family practice (R. 270), examined the plaintiff in 
the hospital emergency room immediately after the accident. He 
described her injuries as follows: 
"Okay. At the time I saw her in the emergency room, she 
had several injuries. She had some swelling around her 
left temple just above her ear and extending midway back 
on her skull. She had about a one and a half inch lacera-
tion or cut across her forehead. She had some bruising 
and swelling of her shoulder on the left side ...... And 
there was no obvious deformity or fracture of that 
shoulder. She had dressings over both of her knees, some 
sterile gauze to protect the areas from infection. I did 
not remove those dressings at that time. I was told that 
one could see the underlying bone through the dressings. 
And since it was apparent that that was a surgical problem, 
I ordered X-rays of those areas and then later removed the 
dressings in the operating room. And then, further, she 
had an obvious deformity of her right ankle. The right 
ankle was bent at almost 90 degrees to the leg, and there 
was a little small hole penetrating the right ankle." 
(R. 272). 
Surgery was subsequently performed by Dr. John Mendenhall, 
an orthopedic surgeon attached to the Payson Hospital (R. 273). 
Dr. Flinders participated jointly with Dr. Mendenhall in the post-
operative recovery, which was complicated by fever and infection 
in the left knee, for the treatment of which plaintiff was read-
mitted to the Payson Hospital on September 20, 1977 (R. 274). 
She continued to complain of persistent pain in her left knee, 
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and medications were prescribed for relief of pain and reductio:! 
of inflammation. On various examinations in follow-up care she 
appeared to be in pain and discomfort. She had an obvious 
limp in her left knee at times and continued to complain of 
pain (R. 276). 
Dr. John Paul Mendenhall, an orthopedic surgeon (R. 284), I 
testified that he examined the plaintiff at the Payson Hospital I 
on July 20, 1977, and took X- rays of the plain tiff (Exhibits 16-:j 
He stated that the X-ray of plaintiff's right foot shmved the 
foot twisted at least 90 degrees and the joint of the mid-foot 
had come apart, with only one bone of the mid-foot just beloH 
the ankle in its proper position. He stated that this type of 
injury was serious because: 
"The bone that is found in the body just beyond the mid 
shin bone of the leg has unusual blood supply, because 
the majority of its surfaces are involved in joint motion, 
and it is very easy for the blood supply to the bone to 
be interrupted, and the bone subsequently dies with the 
decreased blood supply to the area. It is also easy for 
infection. It is our medical experience that dislocations 
in this area often result in early arthritis. 
Q. What's the significance of that? If early arthritis 
sets in, what's the significance of that? 
A. The patients frequently have loss of motion as well 
as pain." (R. 287) ...... "The common procedure is to do 
surgery and obliterate the joints so that the bones become 
attached one to the other, and then the joints aren't 
present to give the pain ..... 
Q. Hait. Pardon me, Doctor. Before I leave that, I did 
want to ask you this: Would this type of an injury have 
a tendency to produce pain in a patient with or without 
the fusing of the foot at the time that she ~ad it? 
A. Yes. These are extremely painful. 
Q. And would these have a tendency to give her orcblems 
for an indefinite period of time with respect to"paln and 
discomfort? 
14 
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A. It's a common experience in a medical practice, in 
an orthopedic practice, to observe patients who have 
dislocated subtalar joints to have pain subsequently. 
Q. And is an injury of this type susceptible to arthritis 
or arthritic involvement? 
A. That's correct." (R. 288). " ..... There are two 
reasons why the question of arthritis is high in this 
type of an injury. One is the healthy cartilage would 
receive severe violence or the foot would not come off 
in -- Another thing is that the circulation is impaired 
and that the cartilage is not healthy. And the other one 
is that the joints are all interrelated, and if the one 
of them wears in a -- and then the wear is then perpetua-
ted to the adjacent joint. It is common for the three 
joints that were dislocated here to be thought of as one 
unit, and injury to one frequently results in an injury 
to all three." (R. 289). 
Dr. Mendenhall stated that Exhibit 17 showed that the 
patella of plaintiff's left knee was in several pieces, and that 
fractures of this type frequently become infected, are more 
difficult to heal, and require more aggressive surgical treatment. 
Exhibit 19 is an X-ray of the right knee which also shows a 
comminuted fracture of the patella (R. 289-290). He justified 
his surgical procedure in attempting to preserve the patella of 
the left knee as follows: 
"It is my professional op~n~on that heroic attempts 
should be made to preserve patellas, and at this point 
in my medical practice I have not excised one or dis-
carded the complete patella. I feel that it is proper 
medicine to do everything possible to preserve the kneecap 
for several reasons: one is it has importance as far as 
the ability to straighten the knee in that it gives a 
mechanical advantage to the kneecap. It alsa has 
benefit as far as its appearance. It is, my feeling 
is supported by the fact that a great deal of research 
has gone into prosthesis, an artificial patella, so 
that proper orthopedics dictates that very heroic measures 
are taken before a kneecap is removed." 
He stated that the patella was important 
"Because of the levers that it applies and the mechani-
cal advantage, it makes it that the muscles of the thigh 
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are more efficient and can straighten the lee better, 
which is useful in kneeling, climbing stairs, many 
functions of both daily living as well as it's import-
ant athletically. 
Q. Even is beneficial to operation of the thigh 
muscles, you say, to have the protection of the patella? 
A. That is correct." 
He stated that all bending of the knee to some degree would be 
affected by the rerr.oval of the patella (R. 292). Dr. Mendenhall! 
described the surgical procedures he performed as foll01i7S: 
"The patient was taken to the operating rcorn, and the 
scrubbing 1i7as done to the surface of both lower limbs, 
after which sterile sheets and drapes, cloth as well 
as paper and plastic, were applied. A large amount 
of fluid was used to wash out the knees as well as the 
ankle. Force was applied to the foot, meaning that 
the foot was pulled in a vigorous manner until the bones 
came back into place, after which more irrigation was 
done and loose stitches were put in the skin. A dressing 
was then pla.ced over the ankle. The sarre procedures v1ere 
then done to the knee in that a large amount of irriga-
tional water was used to wash out all pieces of dirt, 
small pieces of bone, cartilage, and any foreign material. 
Small pieces of bone that were not well attached were 
discarded, and the two largest pieces of kneecap were 
joined together by taking heavy wire, passing it through 
drill holes and twisting it on itself until jt stuck the 
major pieces together. The under-surface of the kneecap 
was inspected to see that the pieces were in reasonable 
position. Additional irrigatio:n was done. The skin on 
the right knee was closed with stitches. The skin on the 
left knee was closed except a rubber rube v1as placed in 
the knee coming out through the skin and out into the 
dressing, dressings were applied, and strips of plaster 
were laid down the back side of both lower limbs." 
The plaintiff later developed an infection in ber left 
knee which Has difficult to treat (R. 296) . 
Dr. Eugene Chapman has practiced orthopedic surgery 
since 1955 (R. 300). He examined the plaintiff on June J 9' 1 q 7t. 
at his office in Provo. At that time his clinical ex<nnjnaticr 
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"showed that she had a transverse scar across the 
right patella and an oblique scar o~ the anterior 
~spect of the left knee. Range of motion of the right 
knee was normal. The left knee lacked 20 degrees of 
complete flexion, and there was no ligament instability. 
There were scars on the lateral aspect of the right 
ankle. There was normal dorsaflection and plantar-
flection, meaning up and down motion of both ankles; 
but she lacked 50 percent of inverse and everse motion, 
meaning in and out motion of the right ankle as com-
pared to the left ..... The lack of motion in inver-
sion and eversion reduces the agility ... of what we 
call the midtarsal area, meaning the mid-ankle area, 
and it is usually due to some underlying injury to 
the joint called the subtalar joint, which is just 
below the ankle, a sign of fibrosis around the joint 
and arthritis." (R. 301-302). 
Exhibit 30 is an X-ray taken by Dr. Chapman at his office 
on June 19, 1978, of plaintiff's right ankle and foot. He testi-
fied that this X-ray showed some arthritic change near the talar-
navicular joint and some narrowing of the subtalar joint, indi-
eating hastened arthritis of these joints due to the injury. He 
stated that his examination of the original films disclosed a 
severe injury of the talarnavicular and subtalar joints that 
would cause traumatic arthritis in those joints (R. 304). 
Dr. Chapman also took X-rays of the plaintiff's knees 
(Exhibits 31-37). After examining these various X-rays, Dr. 
Chapman decided on the initial visit of the plaintiff that she 
would be better off with the left patella removed than with 
leaving it in, because of the marked roughness seen on the 
X-rays, and the tenderness and limited motion. She was admitted 
to the Utah Valley Hospital on July 9, 1978, where surgery was 
performed on July lOth, removing the patella of the left knee 
and making plastic re~air of the exterior mechanism (R. 306-307). 
ne described the OPeration as follows: 
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"The day after admission on July lOth she ;.;as given a 
general anesthetic, and with proper cleansing of the 
knee I did an incision in the knee, and preserved the 
ligaments of the extensor mechanism, but removed the 
kneecap. And I examined the kneecap, and the marked 
irregularity and roughness was confirmed by direct 
investigation that was seen on X-ray. I did then an 
overlapping repair taking the four corners of the cut 
in the ligament and repairing them in an overlapping 
manner to create a fibrous type of patella, and then 
closed the wound and a cast was applied." (R.308). 
He testified that activities such as bending either knee 
or standing too long, would have a tendency to produce or incre1 
pain, and that pain is increased by a variety of activities, 1k.: 
cause the joints to move and the more often and repeated they 
have to move, the more the pain and disability. After the 
operation he applied a cast from the upper groin down to just 
above the ankle (R. 309). When the cast was removed on Septem· 
ber 7th plaintiff was told to still use crutches and gradually 
increase the weight on her foot, depending on the feeling of 
increase-d strength, but cautioned against falling. She was put 
on a weight lifting regimen (R. 310). In describing the reason 
for the patellectomy, Dr. Chapman stated: 
"I'm very reluctant to remove a patella and in the 
average case may wait months or years of conservative 
care, see if the patella can regenerate, and do an 
intermediate operation to see if that will be suffici-
ent, such as shaving the patella; which, by the way, 
I think she requires on her right knee. But this one 
I think was so irregular that in my mind there was no 
question but that it required removal." (R.311). 
Dr. Chapman testified that plaintiff vlOuld have permaner: 
partial impairment of both knees and of the midtarsal area of 
the right ankle due to the original auto accident injuries. 
stated: 
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"I believe she has 30 percent loss of function of the 
right foot and ankle, 20 percent loss of function of 
the right knee, and 30 percent loss of function of the 
left knee. These figures were arrived at after a recent 
examination of December 6, 1978 ..... According to my 
tables, the 30 percent impairment in the right ankle 
translates to 8 percent impairment of body function, 
the 20 percent in the right knee translates to 7 percent 
body function, the 30 percent impairment of the left 
knee translates to 11 percent body function -- making 
a total of 26 percent loss of bodily function attribu-
table to both knees and the right ankle." (R. 311-313). 
Dr. Chapman also testified that plaintiff would have 
trouble performing many of the tasks of a licensed practical 
nurse, especially if it is a full work day, and he would encour-
age her to try to get lighter work in her own field such as a 
hospital assignment to something lighter, or perhaps retrain to 
something in a different field (R. 313) . He stated that she 
would suffer arthritis in the joints involved, that her condition 
would remain about the same as the current estimate. He testified 
that further surgery would be required on plaintiff's right knee, 
consisting of a patellar shave, a smoothing of the patella, with 
a view to reducing the pain in the knee which without the surgery 
would progress to become worse (R. 314). Such a procedure would 
require a hospitalization of 5 or 6 days, and the cost of such 
procedure for medical and hospital treatment would be about ten 
percent less than the patellectomy. He stated that he would not 
recommend that plaintiff participate in any sports that involved 
running or jogging, as that would hasten the wear of the joints, 
that she should get her exercise in some non-weight-bearing type 
of exercise such as swimming with the arms, and letting the legs 
kick as their tolerance allowed (R. 315). He would not recommend 
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any physical activity which would require the plaintiff to be 
on her knees, stating that kneeling is especially bad for an 
abnormal knee (R. 316). 
"Q. Would you anticipate that she would have difficulty 
with her knees in the condition that they are now in and 
on a permanent basis in coming to a seated position from 
a standing position and from a standing position to a 
seated position? Would it require any special maneuver-
ing of her lower extremity, either one, in this sort of 
activity? 
A. A person with an abnormal arthritic knee would tend 
to stiffen a little while sitting and would have to 
work out that stiffness as he got up from the chair, he 
or she; and also this lack of mechanical advantage that 
occurs when a person does not have a patella would weaken 
the extensor strength, although I try to overcome that 
partially by creation of the fibrous patella." (R. 317). 
On cross examination Dr. Chapman stated that plaintiff had read< 
a fixed state of impairment on December 6, 1978, when he last 
examined her, and that in certain situations if she practices sh1 
may be able to walk without a limp but in other hurried-up situa· 
tions a limp would show up again (R. 318). 
Dr. Edward Spencer, an orthopedic surgeon, testifying for 
the defendant, stated that when he examined plaintiff on Septem· 
ber 29, 1978, she had limited motion in her left knee, atrophyo' 
the muscles in the thigh and calf, surgical scars over the left 
knee and left ankle. She had motion over the right kneee and 
small crepitus in the left formover of the right knee, and some 
ligament instability in the left knee (R. 355). He stated that 
he felt the anterior cruciate ligament had been torn or at leas' 
stretched beyond its limit (R. 356). He described the functian 
of the patella as follows: 
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"Basically the patella serves as a lever arm, and that 
just means that it makes the muscles, the thigh muscles 
that attach to it up this direction function more 
effectively. It's like a crane with a bonm in the 
crane, acts as a lever to give you advantage in lifting 
a heavy object or a rock. Because of the position of 
the kneecap holding the ligament away from the surface 
of the knee, it adds to the strength of the knee. So 
particularly as you bring the knee into a full extension 
or into full flexion it will add to the strength of the, 
or add to the effectiveness of the, muscles. The muscles 
are required to pull about two and a half times their 
normal body weight when the knee is bent this much, 
and without kneecap supporting it it loses some of its 
efficiency. Similarly, the last two degrees of exten-
sion from here to there are again you need the kneecap 
to make it more efficient to be able to do that. The 
muscles by themselves have to work much harder if they 
don't have that kneecap to assist it." 
Dr. Spencer testified that her ability to run, or to engage in 
competitive athletic activity or in sports that required a lot 
of knee work, would be impaired (R. 359). He thought she would 
be able to perform the work of an l.p.n. with some restriction, 
that she could expect after a long day's work pain in her knee 
and swelling. He said she had permanent impairment in her left 
knee but he didn't think she had permanent impairment in her 
right knee or right ankle. He anticipated that there was a 
possibility of impairment in her right knee in the future. He 
testified that plaintiff would have an 18 percent permanent 
disability of the body as a whole as a result of the automobile 
accident (R. 362), but in arriving at that figure he did not 
attribute any permanent disability whatsoever to the right ankle. 
At that time he was not aware of the extent of the dislocation 
of the ankle joint at the time of the accident (R. 364). Never-
theless, with respect to plaintif's right foot, the witness gave 
the following testimony: 
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"Q. Was this a severe enough type of injury that would 
incline you to expect some future development of arth-
ritic change? 
A. You bet. There is a high incidence of arthritis 
in this subtalar joint that develops after one such 
dislocation; very frequent. 
Q. And that's a frequent situation? 
A. (The witness nodded his head.) 
Q. And sometimes that could progress to the point 
where it would be necessary to perform a triparthrodesis? 
A. Yes, if it's painful and debilitating." (R. 365-366). 
The doctor was asked the following question: 
"Q. Is it important in your post-operative, after you 
perform an operation say for the removal of a patella, 
which was performed on this patient on July the lOth 
of last year, would it be helpful to you to continue 
to observe that patient to see how she Has responding 
to that operation? 
A. Surely. I think it's certainly a disadvantage to 
one time see an individual and try and appreciate how 
they accommodate to things ..... 
Q. Hell, would this be useful as a matter of practice 
before you came to a final judgment as to the degree 
of impairment? 
A. I think it would, yes." (R. 367). 
The witness, Carol Lynn Lastowski, testified that she 1·1as 
a nurse in charge of the surgical floor of the Payson Hospital, 
and the plaintiff worked under her supervision (R. 322). She 
described the duties of an 1. p. n. , which are set forth in Exhibi[ 
30, stating that an l.p.n. ,.;ras expected to perform each and all 
of the duties set forth in the Exhibit. \men asked about the 
quality of work performed by the plaintiff, the \vitness stated: 
"Gale was very considerate and kind to 1)atients. '.men 
Gale was given an assignment we didn't ~ave to check 
up on her and follow to see that it was done. If she 
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was told to do something, we knew that it was done and 
that the patient was taken care of. 
Q. Will you state whether she required an extensive 
or a minimum of supervision in the performance of her 
duties? 
A. Minimum." (R. 325). 
When asked about plaintiff's difficulty in performing her work 
after the accident, the witness testified as follows: 
"It was a few days [after] Gale asked me if she could 
go home early because her legs did bother her, that 
they did hurt, and that she had had to take a pain pill, 
and that she didn't want to, you know, be around the 
patients after, you know, taking a pain pill. And she 
missed approximately four days of work because of it. 
And she'd call in and say that her knees, at that time 
she just didn't feel like she could perform her duties. 
We tried to at various times when we could see that 
her legs were bothering her, excuse me, then we tried 
to give her a little lighter load than what we nor-
mally would. 
Q. Would you state whether or not you'd be permitted 
to do this as an indefinite or continuous practice? 
A. Not as an indefinite practice, no, sir, not in the 
field that we worked." (R. 326). 
LOSS OF EARNINGS 
In 1977 the plaintiff lost 8 working days in July, 23 days 
in August, 23 days in September, 21 days in October, 22 days in 
November, 10 days in December up to the 14th -- making a total of 
107 days or 856 hours at $3.47 an hour (R. 344-345). She first 
went to work after the accident around January 15, 1978, and 
after she first started there were periods when she would be 
unable to work at all, and times when she worked a modified shift. 
There were times when other l.p.n. 's took over some of h.er respon-
sibilities even while she was at work because she could not 
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perform them. During all of this time she required prescripticri 
to help her get through the day (R. 346). She has not been 
released to perform any work since admission to the Utah Valley 
Hospital on July 9, 1978. On August 1, 1978, her pay scale was 
increased to $4.32 per hour (R. 347-348). 
Plaintiff's undisputed loss of earnings suffered to the 
date of the trial are computed as follows: 
July 20, 1977 to Dec. 14, 1977 
(856 hours at $3.47 per hour) ....... $ 2,970.32 
Dec. 14, 1977 to Jan. 15. 1978 (184 hours at $3.47 per hour) ....... 538.28 
July 10, 1978 to Aug. 10, 1978 
Aug. 
(184 hours at $3.47 per hour) ••• 0. 0 0 638.28 
10, 1978 to Dec. 10. 1978 
(736 hours at $4.32 per hour) ....... 3,179.52 
$ 7,426.40 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY 
THE SUBMISSION OF THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY. 
Plaintiff laid down skidrnarks that were 79 feet long, 
with the beginning of the skidrnark of her left side being 9 feec 
ll inches West of the East edge of the road, the end of her 
left-hand skidrnark being ll feet 7 inches West of the East edge 
of the road at the point of impact; whereas defendant's vehicl1 
laid down 67 feet of skidrnarks, \vith his right side skidrnar!< 
measuring 10 feet 4 inches from the East edge of the 21-foot 
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road at the beginning of the skidmark, which skidrnark veered left 
approximately 1 foot to 11.5 feet from the East edge of the road 
at the point of impact. Ey the defendant Wall's evidence, the 
right side of defendant's truck lacked only 2 inches of being 
completely on plaintiff's side of the road at the time the 
defendant Wall applied his brakes, and the right side of defen-
dant's truck, veering on a slight angle to the left, was 1 foot 
3 inches over the center of the road at the point of impact 
(Exhibits 40-44, Exhibit 54, R. 428-431). The highway at the 
beginning of plaintiff's skidmarks was 18 feet 4 inches wide 
(R. 267), so that plaintiff was completely on her side of the 
road when she applied her brakes. Even if the highway were 
21 feet wide at that point, her left wheels would have been 
only 7 inches to the left of the center at that time. 
Exhibits 40-44, the correctness of which was admitted 
by the defendant Wall (R. 395-396, R. 399-400), clearly show 
that both plaintiff and defendant were completely on plaintiff's 
side of the narrow road at the point of impact. Defendant Wall 
testified that the skidmarks shown on those Exhibits were made 
by the vehicles involved in the collision, that he saw those 
skidmarks after the accident when he rode over the road (R.399-400), 
and that t~ere was no doubt that the skidrnarks shown on Exhibit 42 
were laid down by his vehicle. The slight angle of the approach 
of both vehicles to the point of impact is clearly indicated by 
the photographs in evidence. Indeed, the defendants' expert 
witness followed this angle in his preparation of Exhibit 65. 
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It is significant that whereas the left Hheels of plaintiff's 
vehicle would have been just left of center when she applied 
her brakes (even if the road were 21 feet wide at that point, 
which it was not), the right v7heels ·of defendant's truck were 
only 2 inches from the center when he applied his brakes, and 
moved to the left approximately 1 foot to the point of in:pact. 
In this respect the defendant \.;all's testimony again confiil!ls 
the accuracy of the officer's measurements. 
It is true that some witnesses testified for the defend- I 
ants that the vehicles after the collision appeared to be in 1 
the middle of the road. None of these witnesses saw the acci-
dent; none of them paid any particular attention to the skichmk! 
none of them disputed the existence of the skidmarks; none of 
them disputed the correctness of the photographs; none of the!!' 
disputed the accuracy of the measurements of the skidrnarks made 
by the investigating officer; and there was no center line on 
the freshly oiled and treated road. The skidmarks remained 
clearly visible on the highway for a good month after the acci· 
dent (R. 331). Indeed, the photographic Exhibits 40-44 were 
taken about ten days after the accident. During all of this 
time the defendant Wall and his witnesses could have checked 
the accuracy of the investigating officer's measurements had 
they desired to do so. The slight angle of the vehicles at the 
point of collision caused the rear end of pl~intiff's vehicle 
to be fish-tailed over the center of the road by the force o: 
the impact, as shown by the photographs taken by the investigvr· 
ing officer, and this n'ay explain the \vitnesses' conclusions t':fl 
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the vehicles involved were in the middle of the road. This 
unsupportable conclusion, which is contradicted by the factual 
evidence and by the testimony of the defendant driver himself, 
did not constitute believable evidence upon which the jury 
could base a finding of contributory negligence on the part of 
the plaintiff. 
The defendants' expert witness charted on Exhibit 65 
the skidmarks of both vehicles using the angles indicated by 
the photographs, and his conclusions were that the plaintiff 
at the time of perception had to turn slightly to her right to 
be completely on her side of the narrow road at the time of 
the impact, while the defendant just had to turn slightly to 
his left to be completely on the wrong side of the road at the 
time of impact. 
Section 41-6-54, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides 
that drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions 
shall pass each other to the right and each driver shall give 
to the other at least one half of the main traveled portion of 
the roadway as nearly as possible. Plaintiff fully complied 
with her statutory duty by yielding more than half of the road 
to the defendant driver. The defendant driver clearly breached 
his statutory duty by moving to the left rather than to the 
right, even though he was already substantially intruding upon 
plaintiff's space. 
It is significant that while plaintiff was properly 
maneuvering to\vard the right and conforming to her statutory 
responsibility of yielding half of the roadway to the defendant 
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Wall, the defendant Wall on the other hand was violating his 
statutory duty and negligently maneuvering his vehicle to the 
left prior to braking, thus assuring an impact completely on 
plaintiff's side of the road. 
It is also significant that before corning into the view 
of plaintiff's car, the defendant Wall was traveling in a dip 
which obscured his presence to approaching vehicles, and where 
the plaintiff could not see him but where he knew himself to be, i 
I 
and where he could not see the plaintiff, so that the defendaru j 
Wall was recklessly traveling blind as far as approaching traffiq 
was concerned, almost completely on the wrong side of the road, 
when the drivers of the vehicles came into each other's view. 
The record is completely devoid of one fact of believable 
evidence which would support a finding of contributory negligenc1 
by the jury, or which would warrant the submission of that issue 
to them, and it is crystal clear that the defendant Wall's 
negligence was the sole proximate cause of the collision. Had I 
I 
he occupied his side of the road within the obscurity of the dip I 
or had he maneuvered to the right to yield half of the roadway I 
I 
to the plaintiff as the statute required, there would have been I 
no collision. It was therefore error for the court to have I 
refused plaintiff's peremptory charge to the jury (plaintiff's I 
requested instruction No. 4) removing the issue of contributorv 
negligence from their consideration, and it was error to give 
the various instructions and special verdict form which allo,,,,ec 
the jury to speculate about that issue. This error having been 
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called to the court's attention by a timely motion for a new 
trial, it was error for the trial court to deny that motion. 
POINT 2 
THE COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE 
PLAINTIFF IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NOS. 1, 6, 7, AND 9, 
AL'TD IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT 
THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
It may be urged that the jury, having found the defendants 
negligent in the verdict which it rendered, cured any error in 
the instruction given and in the failure to give plaintiff's 
requested instruction. However, it is reasonable to assume that 
the jury, feeling authorized under the court's instructions to 
find that the defendants were not negligent, may have been 
inclined to assess a smaller percentage of negligence against 
the defendants; and the jury may also have considered the plain-
tiff less negligent than the 30% which were assessed to her. 
The defendant Wall admitted that he was in the middle of 
the road when his vehicle was hidden within the dip where he 
could neither see nor be seen by opposing traffic, which was 
unaware of his position. Under these conditions it was impera-
tive that he drive his vehicle on the right half of the roadway, 
and reasonable care would require him to do so. That the plain-
tiff was entitled to a granting of her request in instruction 
:Jo. 1 has been so generally long established in this and other 
jurisdictions as to render the citation of authorities superfluous. 
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Had the defendant Wall either remained on his side of th 
road or returned to his side of the road after perception, the 
accident would not have occurrec. Clearly the defendant \;/all 
was guilty of negligence as a matter of law in failing to main-
tain a proper lookout, in failing to drive his vehicle on the 
right half of the roadway, and in failing to keep his vehicle 
under proper control; and plaintiff's requested instructions to 
this effect should have been given. See Ferguson v. Jonesma, 
10 Utah 2d 179, 350 Pacific 2d 404, VJhich held it was ?rejudicia:
1 
error for the trial court to refuse to give the plaintiff's 
requested instruction on his theory of the case. The jury 
should not have been permitted to speculate upon the issue of I 
the defendants' negligence or to find that defendants were not I 
solely responsible for the collision. The defendant :•Tall cannot 
excuse himself from an emergency situation Hhich <Jas created by 
his owr1 negligence. If he had maintained a reasonable lookout, 
he would have seen the plaintiff in time to make the reasonable 
maneuver of his vehicle to the right, even though he was then 
negligently operating his vehicle on the wrong side of the ro~ 
POINT 3 
THE TRIAL COUR':' ERRED IN GIVIl!G niST~UCTIO:~ 
NO. 6 TO THE JURY. 
As previously set forth in the brief, the plaintiff ~as 
entitled to have the negligence of the defenda~ts determined as 
a matter of lmv, and the issue of contributory ne<?lige"'.ce 
have been removed from the jury. Instruction 'lo. 6 allm·1ed t~.e 
ju~; to find either or both of the ryarties negli3ent on the 
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four grounds set forth in the instruction. The court's instruc-
tion No. 6 adopted verbatim the defendants' requested instruction, 
1vhich was lifted out of JIFU Section 21.1. 
The defendant Wall claimed that he didn't see the plain-
tiff until she was 50 feet away. Clearly he was failing to keep 
a proper lookout, as she saw him when they were separated by 
over 300 feet, and because he was sitting higher in the truck 
as he came up over the hill he had the best opportunity of 
seeing her first. Clearly the jury should not have been allowed 
to find that plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care to 
keep a lookout for defendant's truck. 
While the plaintiff controlled her vehicle to the right 
of center, the defendant did not. The jury should not tave been 
allmved to speculate that plaintiff failed to keep her vehicle 
under reasonable control. Furthermore, in the instruction the 
jur; were authorized to find that either or both defendant and 
plaintiff were guilty of speeding. There was no evidence in 
the record of speed on the part of either driver, both operating 
their vehicles on a clear dry day within the speed limit, and 
there was no evidence that excessive speed could have been a 
proximate cause of the collision. 
On the fourth ground of negligence set forth in the instruc-
tion, the jury was authorized to find that the plaintiff drove 
her vehicle on the wrong side of the road, and there was no 
believable evidence upon which such a finding could be based. 
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POINT 4 
THE COU~T ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 8, 
AND IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. ll AS REQUESTED WITH REGARD 
TO DAMAGES. 
I The court altogether failed to instruct the jury on menta:' 
i pain and suffering and disfigurement. That mental pain was a 
very substantial matter in this case is evidenced by the fact 
that prior to the collision the plaintiff rvas an attractive 
young woman 21 years of age, who derived a great deal of pleasun
1 
and enjoyment from various athletic endeavors, including competi·l 
tive racing, basketball, softball, jogging, water skiing and 
snow skiing. She had won trophies in horse shows and rodeo 
competition, participating in barrel racing and pole leaning 
I 
I 
I 
events on her purebred Appalossa mare, which she had ridden froo 1 
her childhood, which corresponded with its colthood. 
I She thoroughly enjoyed her chosen profession of nursing, I 
and her nursing activities were most satisfactory to her super- \ 
visors. A 26% permanent bodily disability preventing her from I 
I 
engaging in or doing well in her chosen profession, and prevent· I 
ing her from participating in the various athletic endeavors I 
which she so much enjoyed, would be particularly distressing to 
her, and would cause her to suffer considerable mental, as well 
as physical, pain throughout her reasonable life ex?ectancy of 
57.7 years. 
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Plaintiff's entire life style was changed and disrupted 
by the injuries she sustained in the collision. Particularly 
because of the more serious injury to her left knee she has 
difficulty in climbing stairs, in rising to her feet from a 
seated position, and in going to a seated position. She cannot 
get down on her knees to perform housework or do other things. 
When she sits down on the floor to perform some housework or 
other activity she has great difficulty in getting back on her 
feet. She cannot engage in her favorite activity of horseback 
riding without severe limitation and pain. She suffered exten-
sive scarring to her face, knees, and ankle. The removal of the 
patella of her left knee radically changed its appearance and 
made it so that it was not symmetrical to her right knee, and 
plaintiff is sensitive about this permanent disfigurement. With 
such drastic modification of her life style, plaintiff will suffer 
serious mental anguish throughout her life eX?ectancy. The jury 
certainly needed an instruction on this important fundamental 
issue of mental pain and suffering in order to properly and 
reasonably evaluate plaintiff's damages. The need for such an 
instruction is greatly emphasized by the apparent failure of the 
jury to take such suffering into account in arriving at their 
shamefully inadequate verdict. 
In this connection, we desire to call the court's attention 
to 22 Am Jur 2d Section 353 which states as follows: 
"When the evidence established a basis for recovery for 
mental anguish or other mental disturbance, the instruc-
tion should be drawn to permit the jury to consider 
that element of injury in assessing the damages. In 
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such cases requested instructions which deny the jury 
the right to compensate for mental suffering must be 
refused." 
To the same effect is Bruce v. Madden, 208 Va 636, 160 
S.E. 2d 137. In that case the plaintiff >vas involved in an 
accident which aggravated a previous hip condition, and the 
plaintiff suffered some neck and hip pain. The plaintiff 
required more frequent injections of cortisone to relieve the 
increased pain caused by the flare-up of the difficulty Hith 
his hip joint. 
He quote from that case as follows: 
"The plaintiff offered an instruction on damages 
which would have told the jury that it could consider 
five separate elements listed therein in ascertaining 
the amount of damages to be awarded the plaintiff. 
One of those elements was contained in paragraph 4, 
which was worded as follows: 'The mental Rnguish, if 
any, the plaintiff has endured as a result of his 
injuries.' The trial court, over the objection of 
the plaintiff, struck that paragraph from the instruc-
tion ..... . 
"The plaintiff, on the other hand, contended in 
the trial court and contends here that the jury, from 
the evidence before it, could have inferred that he 
endured mental anguish as the result of the injuries 
sustained in the accident of July, 1965. It was error, 
therefore, the plaintiff says, for the trial court to 
strike from the instruction offered by him the para-
graph which would have permitted the jury to consider 
mental anguish as an element of damages. 
"Hith the plaintiff we agree. In Norfolk & \.J.Ry.Co. 
v. Marpole, 97 Va. 594, 599, 34 S.E. 462, 464 (1899), 
we considered an instruction which had been granted by 
the trial court and which had been objected to because 
'it allowed the jury, without special proof, in fiA~ng 
the plaintiff's damages, to take into consideration 
his mental suffering. ' He held that there '.vas no error 
in the granting of the instruction and cited with ap-
proval the holding in the case of Brown v. Hannibal & 
St. J.R. Co., 99 Mo. 310, 12 S.\v. 655 (1899), '"'here it 
was stated: 
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"1 *i<i<'~< Physical pain and mental anguish usually, 
and to some extent, necessarily, flow from, or attend, 
bodily injuries. It is not necessary to make specific 
proof of pain and mental anguish. These elements of 
damages are sufficiently shown by the evidence which 
discloses the nature, character and extent of the 
injuries. From such evidence the ~u~ rna~ infer pain 
and mental anguish. 1 [Emphasis ad e .) 9 Mo., at 
318-319, 12 s.tv., at 656 .... 
"[1, 2] Thus, it is well settled in this juris-
diction that mental anguish may be inferred in those 
instances where such would be the natural and probable 
consequence of bodily injury and that it is error in 
such a situation to refuse to instruct the jury that 
it may consider mental anguish as an element of damages. 
"Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff, it is reasonable to state that 
he sustained, in the accident in question, an aggrava-
tion of his pre-existing hip injury, causing severe 
pain and marked loss of motion. He became restless, 
unable to sleep, and hampered in his employment. He 
was required to undergo additional treatment and to 
take "pain pills." The plaintiff also sustained an 
injury to his neck, causing pain and requiring treatment 
of an unpleasant nature. 
"From all of this, the jury would have been justified 
in inferring that the plaintiff endured mental anguish 
as the result of his injuries and would have been war-
ranted in awarding a reasonable amount to cover that 
element of damages. It was error, therefore, to with-
hold the element of mental anguish from the jury's 
consideration." 
Plaintiff respectfully contends that the elements of mental 
pain and anguish were far greater in the case at bar than in the 
Virginia case above cited. 
The element of permanent disfigurement is also conspicu-
ously absent from the court's instruction No. 8, although this 
serious element of damage was covered in plaintiff's requested 
instruction No. 11. 
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See also King v. Britt, N.C. 148 N.E. 2d 594 (1966). 
We quote from that case at page 598: 
"Plaintiff did not testify that she suffered any 
mental pain or anguish or embarrassment or humilia-
tion because of the permanent scar on her forehead. 
However, as a general rule, in personal injury cases 
where mental pain and suffering form an element of 
recovery damages by reason of mutilation or disfig-
urement of the person, direct proof of such pain and 
suffering is not necessary, but it may be inferred 
by the jury from the facts of the case or there may 
be substantial evidence from which the jury may imply 
its existence. Muse v. Ford Motor Co., Supra 25A, 
C.J.S. Damages Section 162 (7) p. 100. In our opinion, 
and we so hold, plaintiff's evidence would pe~it a 
jury to infer and find that the permanent scar on 
appellant's forehead caused leer to suffer mental pain. 
"Nowhere in the charge did the court instruct the 
jury that they could award damages for mental pain 
and suffering .... The assignments of error to the 
charge are good. The judge should have charged the 
jury that if they found from appellant's evidence that 
appellant suffered mental pain as a result of the 
permanent scar on her forehead, negligently inflicted 
by the defendant's tort, as he admitted, this mental 
pain should be considered by the jury as an element 
of actual or compensatory damage in passing on the 
issue submitted to them. The trial court is required 
to charge the law upon all substantial features of 
the case arising on the evidence even though there is 
no request for such special instructions ..... 
"For prejudicial error in the charge appellent is 
entitled to a new trial." 
See also Pestotnik v. Balliet, (Iowa) 10 N.W. 2d 99; 
Southweld v. DeBoer (Neb) 80 N. W. 2d 8 77; f.'!ullendore v. Genu;: 
(Ho.) 377 S.W. 2d 494. I 
TI1is court has also recognized this principle in Paul~ 
Kirkendall 261 P. 2d 670 (1953). In that case an instruction 
allowing plaintiff compensation "for any pain, discomfort, fes:j 
I 
anxiety, and other mental and emotional distress" \vas approv2.:: 
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the court noting that the permanency of plaintiff's disability 
in that case would indicate limitation of the enjoyment of prior 
habits of work and recreation. 
POINT 5 
THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY WERE GROSSLY 
INADEQUATE, AND THE JURY DISREGARDED THE GREAT 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE INSTRUCTIONS 
OF THE COURT IN THE AMOUNT AWARDED FOR DAMAGES. 
It is inconceivable that the jury could have given fair 
and proper consideration to the evidence regarding the extensive 
injury and permanent disability and suffering of the plaintiff 
in fixing general damages at $10,000, particularly when they 
were told by the court in its instruction No. 8 that their 
assessment of general damages should take into account the 
nature, character, extent, and severity of her injuries, past 
and future pain, suffering, impairment of bodily functions, 
disability, impairment of earning capacity, and future medical 
and hospital expenses. 
It was stipulated by the plaintiff that the plaintiff 
would incur future medical and hospital expenses in connection 
with the scheduled Spring operation in the amount of $2,134.80. 
Her continuing disability at the time of the trial, and through 
the recovery period from the scheduled operation, would involve 
a minimum loss of earnings of $4,500 (six months at $9,000 per 
year.) The jury's verdict would leave her with approximately 
SJ,SOO to cover all bodily disability, pain, suffering, loss of 
earnings, impairment of earning capacity, impairment of bodily 
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functions, permanent impairment of her enjoyment of life, her 
ability to perform household duties, and enjoyment of recrea-
tional activity throughout her 57.7 years of reasonable life 
expectancy. This $3,500 is also supposed to cover all of her 
mental pain and suffering related to these various disabilities I 
and to the permanent substantial disfigurement of her knees and', 
ankle. The amount awarded plaintiff for general damages by 
the jury's verdict would not cover a small part of the damages 
she suffered through loss of future earnings and through perma-
nent impairment of her earning capacity alone, without regard 
to all the other elements of compensatory da~Ege. 
Dr. Chapman, who had the principal treatment of the 
plaintiff after the first operation, measured her permanent 
disability of the body as a whole at 26%. It is true that 
Dr. Spencer, testifying on behalf of the defendants, after one 
examination placed her permanent bodily disability at 18%, but 
Dr. Spencer did not allow any disability for the right knee or 
right ankle, both of which ~vere permanently impaired. 
Plaintiff suffered the shattering of the oatella on both 
knees. The orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Mendenhall, stated that 
heroic attempts should be made to preserve the patella because 
of the levers it applies and the mechanical advantage it ~novicie1 
making the muscles of the thigh more efficient and enabling t~J 
better straightening of the leg which is useful in kneeling, 
climbing stairs, and performing many functions of daily livi::1: 
as ~vell as its i~portance athletically. He stated that all 
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bending of the knee would be affected by the removal of the 
patella (R. 292). Dr. Mendenhall did in fact make a heroic 
attempt to preserve the patella by the surgery he performed on 
both knees, but it became necessary for another orthopedic sur-
geon, Dr. Chapman, to subsequently remove the patella on the 
left knee almost a year later, and Dr. Mendenhall at the time 
of the trial had scheduled further surgery in the Spring on 
the plaintiff's left knee. 
Dr. Chapman also stated that the X-rays taken by him on 
June 19, 1978 (Exhibit 30) showed arthritic change in the talar-
navicular and subtalae joints, indicating hastened arthritis of 
these joints due to the injuries (R. 304). The arthritic pro-
blem in the right foot and ankle observed clinically and by X-ray 
examination by Dr. Chapman vindicated Dr. Mendenhall's assertion 
that this type of injury often results in early arthritis (R.287). 
The defendants witness, Dr. Spencer, did not dispute Dr. Chapman's 
diagnosis of hastened arthritis shown by Exhibit 30. 
To compensate plaintiff for ~er economic loss in the 
permanent impairment of her earning capacity, loss of future 
earnings, need to forsake her chosen vocation and qualify herself 
for alternative work, would require a verdict several times larger 
than the award given by the jury without any regard to her physical 
and mental pain and permanent disability. Truly, the judicial 
conscience of the trial court should have been shocked by the 
verdict's gross inadequacy. Perhaps the jurors' indifference to 
the evidence in this regard is partially attributable to or mani-
fested by the fact that three of them slept at various times 
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during the trial. In any event, the jury certainly disregardec 
the evidence and disregarded the instructions of the court in ' 
their assessment of both general and special damages. To give 
judicial approval to such a flagrant miscarriage of justice~~ 
i 
do violence to the principles of justice which all courts have, 
duty to preserve. 
In Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P. 2d 176, the 
court granted a new trial in 1940 when 
general damages for the wrongful death 
a life expectancy of 35 years. 
I 
the jury only allowed WI 
of a 30-year old son ~Vit 
I 
Plaintiff does not contend that the court should disrega: 
a jury verdict simply because he would have acted differently ' 
under the evidence. Of course, it is the duty of the court to 
give proper regard to the fact finding prerogative of the jury. 
In his special concurring opinion in Holmes v. Nelson, 
7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P. 2d 722, Justice Crockett makes a comment 
';vhich we think applicable here. He quote from page 441 of the 
Utah Reports: 
"If the trial court is to fulfill his function of 
maintaining general supervision over litigation to see 
that justice is done, it is necessary that he have the 
power to set aside verdicts and grant ne~v trials when 
that objective is not served. But such prerogative 
should be exercised with caution and forbearance con-
sistent with his important and imperative duty to safe-
guard the right of trial by jury. The verdict, vJ~f'~ 
supported hv substantial evidence, should be regarded 
as presumptively correct and should not be interfered 
with merely because the judge mig~t disagree with the 
result. The prerogati·ve should onl;r be exercised when, 
in the view of the trial court, it seems clear that the 
jury has nisapplied or failed to take into account 
proven facts; or misunderstood or disre~arded the law; 
or made findings clearly against the weight of the 
40 I 
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evidence so that the verdict is offensive to his sense 
of justice to the extent that he cannot in good con-
science permit it to stand." 
In the case of Badon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P. 2d 
326, the Supreme Court overruled the trial court's denial of a 
motion for new trial and granted a new trial unless the defendant 
would accept an additur to $500. In that case the jury had 
awarded the plaintiff $100 general damages upon evidence which 
showed that the plaintiff had eaten some contaminated sausage 
from which he contracted trichinosis with no substantial injury. 
He was not hospitalized. He lost $55 for a week's wages and 
$14 doctor bill, or a total of $69 of out-of-pocket damage, 
which left him $31 as general damages for pain, distress and 
inconvenience of having the disease. 
We quote from the decision at page 45 of Utah Reports: 
"[3] We are not here concerned with any question as 
to whether the disparity in the verdict is so gross as 
to indicate that the whole verdict is so suffused with 
passion and prejudice that it should ~e entirely set 
aside. The contention here is that the verdict is out-
side the limits of what appears justifiable under the 
evidence to the extent that it should not be permitted 
to stand. In such instances the remedy is to order a 
modification of the verdict to bring it within the evi-
dence; and the adverse party is given the choiGe 
of accepting it or taking a new trial. This alternative 
does not infringe upon the right of trial by jury, be-
cause the party favored by the orde~ has had his trial 
by jury and is seeking relief from the inadequacy of the 
jury verdict, while the party adversely affected always 
can choose the new trial if he so desires ..... 
"That the same rule as to setting aside or modifying 
a verdict for excessiveness of damages should also ap?ly 
to inadequacy is indicated in the language of the recent 
case of P9.ul v. ;~ir'cencocll. Th~s c::mrt, t;-:.:::-ou;h :::':lief 
Justice ~Donou2h, said: 
"'If inadeauacv or excessiveness of ti1e verdict *"~<* 
shO'"~S a disregard '"''"'' of the evidence or the instruc-
tione *** as to satisfy the court that the verdict 
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was rendered under such disregard or misapprehen-
sion of the evidence or influence of passions or 
prejudice, then the court may exercise its discre-
tion in the interest of justice and grant a new 
trial'. 
citing Saltas v. Affleck, ~vherein tacit approval was 
given to an order of the trial court directing that an 
award of $800 for the death of plaintiff's son be in-
creased to $2,400, which the defendant was directed to 
accept or take a new trial ..... 
"We affirm the responsibility of this court to be 
indulgent toward the verdict of the jury, and not to 
disturb it so long as it is within the bounds of reason, 
in accordance with the principJ es set forth in the con>-
panion case of Schneider v. Suhr~ann; and also that it 
is prill1arily the prerogative and the duty of the trial 
court to pass upon the adequacy of the verdict and to 
order any necessary modification thereof. Nevertheless, 
when the verdict is outside the limits of any reasonable 
appraisal of dama.ges as shown by the evidence, it should 
not be permitted to stand, and if the trial court fails 
to rectify it, we are obliged to make the correction 
on appeal." 
The above case is the only case 'lve have found \vherein tht 
Supreme Court, in the interest of justice, reversed the judgmen: 
of the trivl court and made an additur on its mm as a conditior 
to the granting of a new trial. Certainly in this case the trii 
court had a wide discretion to rrtake an appropriate additur to ti' 
shockingly inadequate jury award; and the court, in the exerds1 
of its judicial conscience had the right and the duty to IT'ake ar 
appropriate addition to the jury verdict. 
In this case the jury miserably failed in its fact-findir:l 
duty; it disregarded the evidence presented to it; and it clear i 
failed to follow the court's instructions. \,'e respectfull:,• I 
submit that the trial court fa::.led in its duty to grant a nei·J I 
I 
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trial. The jury system, long venerated in this country, is best 
served when a verdict unworthy of respect is set aside. This 
court is not required to dignify with its ratification a verdict 
which shocks the judicial conscience. 
POINT 6 
THE JURY ERRED IN THE AWARDING OF SPECIAL DAMAGES 
The court in its instruction included the loss of earn-
ings from the date of injury to the date of trial as an item of 
special damage. Plaintiff's undisputed loss of earnings during 
this time amounted to $7,426.40. It was stipulated that plain-
tiff's medical and hospital expenses up to the tin1e of the trial 
totaled $8,335.08. 
The amount of special damages awarded by the jury should 
therefore have been $15,761.48, rather than the amount of 
$15,000. The deficiency in the amount aw·arded by the jury for 
special damages should have been corrected by the trial judge to 
conform to the undisputed evidence in that respect. 
CONCLUSION 
For the various reasons set forth in this brief, the plain-
tiff was deprived of a fair trial in the court below. We respect-
fully urge this court in the furtherance of justice to grant a 
new trial to the plaintiff, and to order that the new trial be 
lirrited to the jssue of damages only, with appropriate directions 
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to the trial court to instruct the jury adequately on all co~ 
pensable injuries sustained by the plaintiff, particularly wi~ 
respect to mental pain and suffering. 
Respectfully subrritted, 
HOODROH D. \;'lUTE 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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